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Abstract
Traders buy and sell financial instruments in hopes of making profit, and brokers are responsible
for the transaction. Some brokers, known as market-makers, take the position opposite to the
trader’s. If the trader buys, they sell; if the trader sells, they buy. Said differently, brokers
make money whenever their traders lose money. From this somewhat strange mechanism emerge
various conspiracy theories, notably that brokers manipulate prices in order to maximize their
traders’ losses. In this paper, our goal is to perform this evil task optimally. Assuming total
control over the price of an asset (ignoring the usual aspects of finance such as market conditions,
external influence or stochasticity), we show how in cubic time, given a set of trades specified
by a stop-loss and a take-profit price, a broker can find a maximum loss price movement. We
also study the same problem under a model of probabilistic trades. We finally look at the online
trade setting, where broker and trader exchange turns, each trying to make a profit. We show
that the best option for the trader is to never trade.
1 Introduction
Trading is the practice of buying or selling financial assets with the aim of making a profit.
A trader can buy an instrument at some price p and sell it at price p′, making a profit of
p′ − p (which might be negative). The trader can also sell an instrument not even in his
possession, say at price p, with the obligation to buy it back someday, say at a time where
the new price is p′, making a profit of p− p′ (this is called shorting in the trading jargon).
A broker is usually responsible for the execution of a trade, taking care of the technical
aspects of the transaction. There are multiple ways of handling these details, but there is
a particular type of broker, called market-makers, that may do so by placing a trade in the
opposite direction of the trader. To put it simply, if a trader wants to buy an asset, the
market-maker will sell it, and if the trader wants to sell it, they will buy it. After all, there
has to be two parties involved in a transaction, and market-makers assume one of the roles 1.
Now, this puts brokers in a rather peculiar position. By mirroring the trades that they are
paid to execute, they win money when their traders lose money, and lose money when their
traders win money, giving them an incentive for their clients to perform poorly. Even worse,
if they were able to manipulate prices, perhaps they would incur as much losses as possible
to their traders! In fact, if one searches the Internet long enough, one can find articles and
forum discussions involving conspiracy theorists that believe that brokers, having access to
large amounts of capital and trader information, do influence prices in their favor somehow.
These ideas are reinforced by statistics showing that a majority of traders lose money 2.
1 This is especially prevalent in markets in which there are no restrictions on buying versus selling, for
instance the currency exchange market. Unlike the stocks market where regulations on shorting may
apply, buying Euros with US dollars is not more or less restricted than selling Euros to buy US dollars
2 See e.g. : https://www.dailyfx.com/forex/fundamental/article/special_report/2015/06/25/
what-is-the-number-one-mistake-forex-traders-make.html
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2 How brokers can optimally plot against traders
Taking such accusations seriously is likely to make an economist jump out of his seat,
since there are too many factors driving asset prices for a single entity to control it. But
here, we rather take an algorithmic perspective on these theories. To take it to the extreme,
suppose that brokers have total control over the prices. That is, armed with the knowledge
of every trade that is currently active, their goal is to make people lose as much money as
possible. The question is: even with the ultimate power of price manipulation, can they? Is
this optimization problem easy? In this paper, we wear the hat of (would-be) mischievous
brokers and devise price manipulation algorithms to do our evil bidding.
More precisely, we model trades as bounded by two closing prices - a winning and a
losing price. This is typical in trading: traders want to limit their risk and often set up a
stop-loss, a price at which the trade closes automatically when too much losses are incurred.
This is usually accompanied with a take-profit price, which closes the trade when its profit
is high enough. Brokers can use these two pieces of information to their advantage, leading
to three types of problems that we study here. First, given a set of bounded trades, what is
the price movement that maximizes trader losses? We show in Section 2 that this problem
reduces to finding a maximum independent set in a bipartite graph, yielding a O(n3) time
algorithm[4, 5], where n is the number of trades. This question has another interpretation:
as a trader, what is the worst that could happen with a set of opened trades on a single asset?
There seems to be no answer in the literature for this simple question. Algorithms exist for
the seemingly related notions of value at risk [2] and maximum loss [6], but these measures
are based on stochastic prices, operate on multiple assets and are subject to various market
conditions, unlike here. In Section 3, we make the trades probabilistic. That is, each price
has a given probability of being a winning or a losing price, and the goal is to maximize the
expected losses incurred on traders. Interestingly, many papers model prices as stochastic
(e.g. as a Brownian motion [1]), but never the trades. We devise a O(n3S3) algorithm again
based on bipartite graphs, where S is the size of the support of the trades, and show that if
winning and losing prices are uniformly distributed, this task can be accomplished in time
O(n6). Finally in Section 4, we look at the online setting. That is, the trader can add
a new trade at any given time, and the broker still has to maximize losses. This leads to
a two-player game where the trader and broker exchange turns, and we conclude that the
optimal play for the trader is to never trade - the broker never loses.
2 The Maximum Trader Loss Problem
In trading, prices are usually handled to the fourth of fifth decimal, and as they are not
continuous we will consider them as integers, the current price being 0. In this paper, all
trades are done on a single asset, and no fee is required to open a trade. Although this
work is motivated by loss maximization, we will speak of maximizing profit - both because
losses are actually the broker’s profit, and because there is some form of cognitive dissonance
involved for a computer scientist in “maximizing losses”.
A trade T = (oT , wT , `T , sT ) consists of four parameters: oT is the opening price, wT is
the winning price, `T is the losing price and sT is the size of the trade (sometimes called
the volume), which weights the profit or loss made from the trade. We require that either
wT > oT > `T if T is a buy, or wT < oT < `T if T is a sell. Moreover, none of wT or `T
can be between oT and the current price 0. We denote sgnT = 1 if wT > oT > `T and
sgnT = −1 if wT < oT < `T . A trade session consists of a set of trades T and a price
movement M , which can be described by a sequence of ups and downs (m1, . . . ,mk), where
mi ∈ {+1,−1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The current price after the j-th movement is
∑j
i=1mi.
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Given a price movement M , a trade T closes either at price p = wT or p = `T , whichever
is reached first by M . The closing price p ∈ {wT , `T } implied by M is denoted clT (M). The
broker’s profit made from T in a given price movementM is prT (M) = sgnT (clT (M)−oT )sT .
We say that T is won when prT (M) is positive and lost otherwise. This is the “real-life”
profit calculation we are interested in, but some of our algorithms work on arbitrary profit
functions “for free”. We will use p˜rT (M) to denote any function of T and M that can
take two values p˜r+T or p˜r
−
T , which must satisfy p˜rT (M) = p˜r
+
T > 0 if clT (M) = wT and
p˜rT (M) = p˜r
−
T < 0 if clT (M) = `T (in words, wins are positive and losses are negative).
Note that prT (M) is such a function.
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Figure 1 (a) An example input for the MTL problem with |T | = 4. The display order of the
trades is immaterial - they are all received simultaneously. The opening prices are indicated by a
dent in the middle of the trades. Each trade has a winning price (long green dashes) and a losing
price (short red dashes). The profit made by winning a trade is indicated in the green box, and the
profit made by losing it in the red diamond. For instance, T1 has oT1 = 1, wT1 = 4, `T1 = −1 and
sT1 = 10 (sizes are not shown, but are implicitly defined by the profit/loss values). (b) An optimal
price movement M for T that makes a total profit of 30− 15 + 10 + 27 = 52. The green/red lines
now indicate the lifespan of each trade according to M . The profit values not realized by M are
grayed-out. Only T2 is lost since price 3 is reached before −4.
A trade session can be seen as a one-turn two player game where the trader first opens
a set T of trades, and afterwards the broker determines a price movement M . This price
movement occurs and the trades get closed according to it. We require that M closes every
trade eventually. The problem statement follows:
Maximum Trader Loss Problem (MTL) :
Given: a set of trades T ;
Find: a price movement M that maximizes the broker’s profit
∑
T∈T prT (M).
We call a solution M to MTL an optimal price movement for T . Some observations
about M are in order here. Consider the trade T = (0, 2n,−2n, 1), where n is the size of the
input. As M has to close T , representing M as a sequence of unit movements might yield an
exponential-size output, which is not necessary. Instead M can be described as a sequence
of prices that it reaches, from which the +1/ − 1 sequence can easily be inferred. That is,
if M = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), then p1 = 0 is the initial price, p2 is the second price reached after
a series of |p2 − p1| unit movements (+1 or −1 depending on whether p2 > p1 or p2 < p1),
and so on. We implicitly assume that M is output in this form - it is easy to verify that the
algorithms presented here can do so. As a note, it is not hard to verify that M , if minimal,
makes larger and larger zig-zag movements, and can be described by (p1, . . . , pk) with pi
and pi−1 having different signs and |pi| > |pi−2| for all 2 < i ≤ k.
We show here a simple strategy to determine M : find a set of compatible trades to
win, and accept a loss on the other trades. We say that a set of trades T ′ is compatible if
4 How brokers can optimally plot against traders
there exists a price movement M such that prT (M) > 0 for all T ∈ T ′. Otherwise T is
incompatible. Pairs of incompatible trades have a very simple, yet useful characterization:
I Lemma 1. Let T1 and T2 be two trades. Then T1 and T2 are incompatible if and only if
sgnT1 6= sgnT2 , |`T1 | ≤ |wT2 | and |`T2 | ≤ |wT1 |.
Proof. We exhaust every possible case. Suppose first that s = sgnT1 = sgnT2 . If s = 1
(resp. −1), then the price movement that always goes up (resp. down) wins both trades,
and they are compatible. So assume instead that sgnT1 6= sgnT2 . If |`T1 | > |wT2 |, then
the price movement that goes to wT2 first wins T2 and does not reach `T1 . It then suffices
to go from wT2 to wT1 . The same idea applies when |`T2 | > |wT1 |. So finally assume that
|`T1 | ≤ |wT2 | and |`T2 | ≤ |wT1 |. As both trades are of opposite signs, the first price to be hit
has to be a loss, making them incompatible. J
If a set of trades T ′ has two trades T1, T2 that are incompatible, then they cannot both
be won and trivially T ′ is not compatible. The converse also holds.
I Lemma 2. Let T ′ be a set of trades such that every pair of trades from T ′ is compatible.
Then T ′ is compatible. Moreover, one can construct in time O(|T ′|2) a price movement M
such that prT (M) > 0 for all T ∈ T ′.
Proof. We use induction on |T ′|. The case |T ′| = 1 is trivial: it suffices to go to the single
winning price. Suppose by induction that any proper subset of T ′ is compatible. Denote by
T ′(p) the set of trades of T ′ that close at price p, winning or losing. Let p+ be the minimum
value above 0 such that T ′(p+) 6= ∅, and let p− be the maximum value below 0 such that
T ′(p−) 6= ∅. If all trades of T ′(p+) are won at price p+, we can raise the price from 0 to p+,
win these trades, bring the price back to 0 and apply induction on T ′ \ T ′(p+). The same
applies if all trades of T ′(p−) are won at p−. So suppose that there are T1 ∈ T ′(p+) and
T2 ∈ T ′(p−) that are losing. Then T1 is a sell and T2 is a buy, and hence sgnT1 6= sgnT2 .
Moreover, wT2 ≥ `T1 > 0 by our choice of p+, and similarly 0 > `T2 ≥ wT1 . By Lemma 1,
T1 and T2 are incompatible, a contradiction.
It is easy to derive a (naive) O(|T ′|2) time algorithm from this argument: find p+ and
p− by scanning all trades in time O(|T ′|), and one of T ′(p+) or T ′(p−) will contain only
winning trades. We can then move the price to the winning position, close the appropriate
trades and repeat O(|T ′|) times. J
Lemma 2 essentially states that we can devote our efforts to finding a set of pairwise-
compatible trades T ′ that maximizes profit, minus the losses incurred by the trades not in
T ′. We call T ′ an optimal set of winning trades. The advantage of this approach is that we
don’t have to worry about the temporal aspects of price movements, as they will be taken
care of by the algorithm provided by Lemma 2.
The incompatibility graph G = G(T ) of a set of trades T is the graph with vertex set T ,
and an edge between T1 and T2 iff they are incompatible. Note that by Lemma 1, testing
compatibility on a pair of trades can be done in constant time, and thus G can be built
in time O(|T |2). Now, as per Lemma 2, T ′ ⊆ T is compatible if and only if T ′ forms an
independent set in G (a set of vertices with no shared edges). Finding an independent set
of maximum weight is NP-Hard, but we are saved by the following observation:
I Lemma 3. Let T be a set of trades. Then G(T ) is bipartite.
Proof. Let T + = {T ∈ T : sgnT = 1} and T− = T \ T +. Since any pair of trades from T+
are of the same sign, they are pairwise-compatible by Lemma 1. The same holds for any
pair of trades from T−. Therefore, T+ and T− form a bipartition of V (G(T )) J
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There are known polynomial-time algorithms that find a maximum weight independent
set I in a bipartite graph. But before we rush in the reduction that seems natural, in our
setting each trade that is not won is lost and adds a negative profit q, i.e. each vertex not
chosen to be in I must be penalized by a weight of q. This is a bit different than solely finding
a maximum weight independent set, and it is not immediately clear how this problem can be
handled using known algorithms. We show that it suffices to adjust the weights accordingly.
I Theorem 4. Let T be a set of trades and G = G(T ) with each trade T ∈ T having
a profit function p˜rT (M). Let f : T 7→ R be a weighting function that assigns weight
f(T ) = p˜r+T − p˜r−T to every trade T ∈ T . Then T ′ is an optimal set of winning trades if and
only if T ′ is a maximum weight independent set in G with respect to f .
Proof. Let M be a price movement winning every trade of T ′, and let T ′ = T \ T ′ be the
set of lost trades. Since T ′ is optimal, it maximizes
∑
T∈T
p˜rT (M) =
∑
T∈T ′
p˜r+T +
∑
T∈T ′
p˜r−T =
∑
T∈T ′
p˜r+T +
(∑
T∈T
p˜r−T −
∑
T∈T ′
p˜r−T
)
=
∑
T∈T ′
(p˜r+T − p˜r−T ) +
∑
T∈T
p˜r−T =
∑
T∈T ′
f(T ) +
∑
T∈T
p˜r−T
among all possible choices of T ′. Now, because ∑T∈T p˜r−T does not depend on the choice
of T ′, it can be considered as a constant and thus T ′ is optimal if and only if it maximizes∑
T∈T ′ f(T ), i.e. if and only if it is a maximum weight independent set if G(T ). J
Now, the traditional way of finding a maximum weight independent set in a bipartite
graph G is done by finding a minimum-cut/maximum-flow on a slightly modified version
of G3. This can be implemented to run in time O(|T |3) using the Stoer-Wagner min-cut
algorithm [5] or a variety of max-flow algorithms, e.g. [4].
3 Probabilistic trades
One may argue that traders do not open their trades and simply wait for the price to reach
the winning or losing price. Traders are sometimes emotive and may cut their profit or loss
ahead of time, or leave them open a bit longer ‘just in case’. For instance, a movement in
the losing direction may induce the fear that more losses are to come, hence triggering an
early trade close. Or, when the price is about to reach the losing trigger, the trader might
get confident that the price is about to turn around, pushing the losing price further.
This idea adds uncertainty in the determination of the optimal price movement. To
model this situation, we will assume that each trade is accompanied with a probability
distribution on the winning and closing prices. These could, for example, be computed by
the broker by analysis the past behavior of each trader. More precisely, a probabilistic trade
is given by T = (oT , fT , gT , sT , sgnT ) where oT and sT are the opening price and the size
as before, fT (p) = Pr[wT = p] is a probability mass function representing the probability
that T closes with a win when the price reaches p, gT (q) = Pr[`T = q] is a probability mass
function representing the probability that T closes with a loss when the price reaches q, and
3 This method, however, seems too “trivial” to be published anywhere, and hence there is no paper to
cite. To give credit where it is due, the ideas were taken from http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-
engineering-and-computer-science/6-854j-advanced-algorithms-fall-2008/assignments/sol5.pdf
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sgnT ∈ {1,−1} is made explicit. If T is a buy, we require that fT (p) = 0 for p ≤ oT and
gT (q) = 0 for q ≥ oT , and if T is a sell we require fT (p) = 0 for p ≥ oT and gT (q) = 0 for
q ≤ oT . Moreover fT (q) = gT (q) = 0 for q between oT and 0. We assume that fT and gT
are independent. Note that probabilistic trades are a generalization of what we will now
call the deterministic trades described in the previous section.
A trade session can now be seen as such: (1) the broker receives a set of probabilistic
trades T and decides on a price movement M ; (2) the trader randomly picks, independently,
a winning and losing price for each trade T according to fT and gT , respectively; (3) the
price movement M occurs and each trade closes at the prices determined at step 2.
In this setting, a natural option for the broker is to maximize his expected gain. For a
probabilistic trade T , denote by T (w, `) the deterministic trade obtained by fixing wT = w
and `T = `. For a given price movement M and a trade T , the expected profit of T is
E [prT (M)] =
∑
w,` fT (w)gT (`)prT (w,`)(M) where w and ` range over all possible prices.
The problem now becomes the following:
Maximum Expected Trader Loss Problem (METL) :
Given: a set of probabilistic trades T ;
Find: a price movementM maximizing the expected profit E[prT (M)] = E
[∑
T∈T prT (M)
]
.
For a trade T , denote by S(T ) the support of T , that is the set of prices p such that one
of fT (p) > 0 or gT (p) > 0 holds. If T is a set of trades, let S(T ) =
⋃
T∈T S(T ). We may
write S instead of S(T ). We assume that S is finite. We show that if S is not too large,
then probabilistic trades can also be handled by reducing the problem to independent sets
in bipartite graphs. The idea is to simply decompose each trade T into its set of possible
deterministic trades, and solve the underlying deterministic trade setup as before. Note that
this is only possible under the assumption that prices (and hence fT and gT ) are discrete
and S is finite. Other cases remain open.
For T ∈ T and prices w and `, denote by T ∗(w, `) = (oT , w, `, fT (w)gT (`)sT ) the de-
terministic trade corresponding to T with wT = w, `T = ` and with size weighted by the
chances of w and ` occurring. Let T ∗ =
⋃
w,`∈S T
∗(w, `) and T ∗ = ⋃T∈T T ∗.
I Lemma 5. A price movement M is optimal for a set of probabilistic trades T if and only
if M is optimal for the set of deterministic trades T ∗.
Proof. Observe first that for some trade T ∈ T , prices w and ` and price movement M ,
prT (w,`)(M) = 1fT (w)gT (`)prT∗(w,`)(M), because of the size adjustment. Now, starting with
the maximization objective for T , using linearity of expectation we get
E
[∑
T∈T
prT (M)
]
=
∑
T∈T
∑
w,`
fT (w)gT (`)prT (w,`)(M) =
∑
T∈T
∑
w,`
prT∗(w,`)(M) =
∑
T∈T ∗
prT (M)
which is exactly the maximization objective for T ∗. Hence both objectives are equal. J
Using the results from section 2, the METL problem can be solved in time O(|T ∗|3) =
O((|T ||S|)3). One might then (legitimately) ask: is it good? This question deserves a bit
of digressing. If S is large, then this is not really good. But one might argue that S has to
be given in the input in the form of two distributions for every trade. It is then reasonable
to expect our algorithm to depend on |S| if, say, fT and gT are given as two lists of price-
probability pairs for each trade - then the running time is polynomial in the size of the
input. But what if fT and gT can be expressed in a compact form? Maybe fT (or gT )
could be given as the code of a function that computes fT (p) for any price p, which takes
constant space. For instance, the distribution fT (p) = 1/2|T | for all prices 0 < p ≤ 2|T |
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is easy to describe in a few bits, but makes |S| exponential. This discussion leads to the
following question: is there an algorithm for METL that is always polynomial in the input
size? We do not have a general answer, but in the next section, we show that it is the case
for trades opening at 0 and having uniformly distributed closing prices, which are perhaps
the simplest (yet surprisingly difficult to handle) probabilistic trades yielding exponential
|S| from a short description.
Uniform trades
A uniform trade T = (wˆT , ˆ`T , sT ) is a probabilistic trade with opening price oT = 0, size
sT and sgnT = wˆT|wˆT | , and where fT (resp. gT ) is, implicitly, the uniform distribution across
values between 0 and wˆT (resp. 0 and `T ). That is, fT (p) = 1/|wˆT | for all p between 0
and wˆT (excluding 0), and gT (p) = 1/|ˆ`T | for all p between 0 and ˆ`T (excluding 0). Note
that T ∗ has a trade of size sT|wˆT ||ˆ`T | for each price pair p, q with 0 < p ≤ max(wˆT , ˆ`T ) and
0 > q ≥ min(wˆT , ˆ`T ). In the rest of this section, T denotes a set of uniform trades. We
show that even though S might have exponential size, T can be handled in time O(|T |6).
Denote Sˆ = ⋃T∈T {wˆT , ˆ`T }. The idea is to “collapse” every trade of T ∗ to some price of
Sˆ, which is desirable since there are O(|T |) of them (at most two prices per trade). Lemma 6
shows that this is allowable. The proof is somewhat involved, in contrast with the other
ones in this paper, and we leave it to the Appendix.
I Lemma 6. If T is a set of uniform trades, then there is an optimal price movement M
for T ∗ such that M only changes direction at prices that are in Sˆ.
Let Sˆ+ = (p1, . . . , pn) (resp. Sˆ− = (q1, . . . , qm)) be the prices of Sˆ that are above 0,
sorted in increasing order (resp. below 0, sorted in decreasing order). Fix p0 = q0 = 0. Now,
let M be an optimal price movement for T ∗ as described in Lemma 6. Then M alternates
between prices in Sˆ+ and Sˆ−. Let T ∈ T be a buy trade, and let T ′ = T ∗(pi−1+k, qj−1−h) ∈
T ∗ be a corresponding deterministic trade with wT ′ = pi−1+k < pi and `T ′ = qj−1−h > qj
(assume k, h > 0). One implication of Lemma 6 is that since the closing prices of T ′ are
lying between two prices of Sˆ, T ′ is won (resp. lost) by M if and only if T ∗(w, `) is won
(resp. lost) by M for every pi−1 < w ≤ pi and every qj−1 > ` ≥ qj . The same idea applies
to sell trades, and thus all such trades can be collapsed into one using the following scheme.
For a trade T ∈ T and prices pi ∈ Sˆ+ ∩ S(T ), qj ∈ Sˆ− ∩ S(T ) with i, j > 0, let
PT =
∑pi
k=pi−1+1
∑qj−1−1
h=qj sT∗(k,h)k =
(qj−1−qj)sT
2|wˆT ||ˆ`T | (p
2
i + pi − p2i−1 − pi−1) and
QT =
∑qj−1−1
k=qj
∑pi
h=pi−1+1 sT∗(k,h)k =
(pi−qi−1)sT
2|wˆT ||ˆ`T | (−q
2
j + qj + q2j−1 − qj−1). Denote by Tˆ (pi, qj) =
(0, pi, qj , sT ) the deterministic trade accompanied by the profit function p˜rT (M) such that
if T is a buy, p˜r+T = PT and p˜r
−
T = QT , and if T is a sell, p˜r
+
T = −QT and p˜r−T = −PT .
One can verify that winning (resp. losing) Tˆ (pi, qj) corresponds to winning (resp.losing)
every trade of T ∗ having one closing price in the interval (pi−1, pi] the other in [qj , qj−1),
the important point being that these values can be computed quickly. This leads to the next
Theorem, which follows from the discussion above. We omit the full details.
I Theorem 7. Let M be a price movement that is optimal for Tˆ = ⋃(pi,qj)∈Sˆ+×Sˆ− Tˆ (pi, qj)
and, for each T ∈ Tˆ , the corresponding profit function p˜rT (M) as described above. Then M
is optimal for T ∗, and hence also for T .
As Sˆ has O(|T |) values, one can check that Tˆ and profit functions can be constructed
in time O(|T |6) (a generous upper bound) and has O(|T |2) trades. Solving MTL on Tˆ then
takes time O(|T |6), which, despite not looking too attractive, is independent of |S|.
8 How brokers can optimally plot against traders
4 Online trades
In this section, all trades are deterministic. We now allow the trader to interrupt the broker’s
price manipulation at any time in order to add a trade. Under this model, it is not hard
to devise examples in which the previous algorithms may fail, i.e. make the broker lose
money. Here we are only concerned with who makes profit - not necessarily the optimality.
The question is: given his new power, can the trader make money? There is an “obvious”
answer: if there was a strategy for the trader that guarantees profit even against prices
conspiring against him, someone would have figured it out by now. But surprisingly, there
doesn’t seem to be a clear answer in the literature. One impossibility result is given by
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) [3], which essentially states that if prices perfectly
reflect their environment, then no strategy can win consistently, i.e. against every price
movement. In the same vein, assuming the price is a random walk, the best trader strategy
has expected profit 0, so there exists a price movement with no win for the trader. Thus all
the broker has to do is “mimic” a worst-case EMH-driven price, or random walk. How to do
this is not clear though. Moreover, if the trader is allowed to open an infinity of trades, it
can be shown that a Martingale betting system has expected profit strictly above 0 against
a random walk. Here we make no assumption on the finiteness of the trades (though the
trader loses in an infinite game) and provide an explicit strategy for the broker.
This problem can be seen as a game described below. For a given price p, the value of a
trade T at price p is val(T, p) = sgnT (p− oT )sT , and represents the profit the broker would
get if T was closed at price p. The price starts at 0 and the trade set T is initially empty. A
turn starts with the trader adding trades to T (or possibly none), and the broker, moving
second, decides if the prices goes either up or down by 1. If the price p after this move is equal
to either wT or `T for an open trade T , then val(T, p) is added to the broker’s gains g and T
is removed from T . The game ends when a turn finishes with no opened trades. A position
P = (T , g, p) is described by a set of open trades T , the total gain g currently accumulated
by the broker, and the current price p. The value of P is val(P) = ∑T∈T val(T, p) and its
total value is Val(P) = val(P)+g. The i-th turn is described by 3 positions Pi = (Ti, gi, pi),
P ′i = (T ′i , gi, pi) and P ′′i = (T ′′i , g′′i , p′′i ) respectively corresponding to the positions before
that trader’s turn, after his turn, and after the broker’s turn. Note that Pi+1 = P ′′i . The
trader wins the game if and only if the game ends at turn j with g′′j < 0. Thus if the game
never ends (which we do not rule out), then the trader does not win.
We first address the question of losing and winning prices. One could argue that a trader
might have a better strategy if he was able to close an opened trade T at any time, instead
of having to wait for the price to reach wT or `T . The next results shows that this is not
the case, since the trader can always simulate closing a trade at the current price.
I Lemma 8. Let p be the current price. For any trade T , the trader can add a trade T ′
such that for any price movement M , prT (M) + prT ′(M) = val(T, p).
Proof. The desired trade is simply T ′ = (p, `T , wT , sT ). Note that sgnT = −sgnT ′ , and
that both trades will have the same closing price p′ = clT (M) = clT ′(M) whatever the
price movement M is. Thus prT (M) + prT ′(M) = sgnT (p′ − oT )sT − sgnT (p′ − p)sT =
sgnT (p− oT )sT = val(T, p). J
This lets us characterize winning and losing games quite easily:
I Lemma 9. The trader can win if and only if there is a turn i that ends with Val(P ′′i ) < 0.
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Proof. (⇐) If every turn ends in a position P ′′i with Val(P ′′i ) ≥ 0, then either the game
never ends or, in particular, the very last position P ′′j ends with no open trade and hence
val(P ′′j ) = 0. This implies that 0 ≤ Val(P ′′j ) = val(P ′′j ) + g′′j = g′′j and thus the broker won.
(⇒) Suppose that Val(P ′′i ) = val(P ′′i )+g′′i < 0 for some i. If the trader was able to close
all of his trades at their current price, then he would win. This can easily be accomplished
by applying Lemma 8 on every trade of Ti+1. J
Lemma 9 clarifies the goal of the broker: prevent, at all costs, the game to reach a trade
setup with a losing total value. We show that the broker always has a good option.
I Lemma 10. Let Pi be the position when turn i starts. Denote by P+i+1 the (i + 1)-th
position reached if the broker raises the price, and by P−i+1 the (i + 1)-th position reached if
the broker lowers the price. Then Val(P+i+1)− Val(Pi) = −(Val(P−i+1)− Val(Pi)).
In particular, at least one of Val(P+i+1) ≥ Val(Pi) or Val(P−i+1) ≥ Val(Pi) holds.
Proof. Let d ∈ {1,−1}, and let Pdi+1 = P+i+1 if d = 1, and Pdi+1 = P−i+1 if d = −1. The price
at the start of turn i+ 1 is p+d. Let P ′i be the position reached after the trader’s turn, and
note that since every trade in T ′i \ Ti has val(T, p) = 0, we have Val(P ′i) = Val(Pi). Let T dO
be the trades open in both P ′i and Pdi+1, and T dC be the trades open in P ′i but closed in Pdi+1.
Note that T ′i = T 1O∪T 1C = T −1O ∪T −1C . We show that val(Pdi+1)−val(P ′i) =
∑
T∈T d
O
∪T d
C
d·sT ,
which proves the Lemma. If T ∈ T dO , then the value of T varies by val(T, p+d)−val(T, p) =
dsT from P ′i to Pdi+1. If T ∈ T dC , then T is closed, meaning that val(T, p + d) is added to
the broker’s gains gi+1, while val(T, p) is subtracted from val(Pdi+1). The difference implied
by T from P ′i to Pdi+1 is again dsT . J
Since the game starts empty, Val(P1) = 0, and by Lemma 10, the broker always has an
option for this value to never decrease: it suffices, at each turn i, to find which of P+i+1 or
P−i+1 has a better total value. Then with Lemmas 9 we get the following.
I Theorem 11. The broker cannot lose if he plays optimally.
5 Conclusion
We have provided some useful algorithmic tools for malevolent brokers to plot against
traders, but there are still many open questions and directions. For starters, can the O(|T |3)
complexity be improved for MLT? As for METL, what is the relationship between the input
size, |S| and the time required to construct an optimal price movement? Is there a set of
probabilistic trades T that take space polynomial in T and yet requires an output price
movement M of size Ω(2|T |)? 4 Are there other families of probabilistic trades that can be
handled quickly? And finally, can the model be improved? For instance, a single +1/ − 1
movement might have an influence on a trade. If a price goes up, just below a winning price,
then starts going back down, the trader might get scared and close his trade. More realistic
trader models are still open.
Appendix
We prove Lemma 6 here, but we need two intermediate results beforehand.
4 Note however that a positive answer to this question does not rule out that M could be represented in
compact form (e.g. as code describing M ’s movement) just as the input.
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I Lemma 12. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R with n ≥ 1, and suppose that
∑n′
i=1 iXi ≤ 0 for every
1 ≤ n′ ≤ n. Then for any reals a, c > 0, ∑ni=1(a + ci)iXi ≥∑ni=1(a + cn)iXi.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction over n. The base case n = 1 is trivial. For
larger n, we suppose by induction that
∑n−1
i=1 (a + ci)iXi ≥
∑n−1
i=1 (a + c(n − 1))iXi =∑n−1
i=1 ((a + cn)iXi − ciXi) =
∑n−1
i=1 (a + cn)iXi − c
∑n−1
i=1 iXi.
Adding (a + cn)nXn on both ends of the inequality, we get∑n
i=1(a+ci)iXi ≥
∑n
i=1(a+cn)iXi−c
∑n−1
i=1 iXi, which proves the statement as we assume∑n−1
i=1 iXi ≤ 0 and c > 0. J
I Lemma 13. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R with n ≥ 1, and suppose that
∑n
i=1 iXi > 0. Then for
any reals a, c > 0, there exists m ≤ n such that ∑mi=1(a + ci)iXi > 0.
Proof. We use induction again. The case n = 1 is trivial. Assume now that the statement
holds for values smaller than n. If there is a n′ < n such that
∑n′
i=1 iXi > 0, then we
can apply induction and find m ≤ n′ that satisfies ∑mi=1(a + ci)iXi > 0. If no such n′
exists, then for every n′ between 1 and n− 1, ∑n′i=1 iXi ≤ 0. Note that then, X1, . . . , Xn−1
satisfy the condition of Lemma 12. Since
∑n−1
i=1 iXi+nXn > 0, we must have (a+cn)nXn >
−(a+cn)∑n−1i=1 iXi. Suppose now that the statement fails on m = n, i.e. ∑n−1i=1 (a+ci)iXi+
(a+cn)nXn ≤ 0. Then (a+cn)nXn ≤ −
∑n−1
i=1 (a+ci)iXi. Our two complementary bounds
on (a + cn)nXn imply
∑n−1
i=1 (a + ci)iXi < (a + cn)
∑n−1
i=1 iXi. This however contradicts
Lemma 12. J
Proof of Lemma 6: Call a direction change (i.e. +1 followed by −1 or vice-versa) bad if it
occurs outside of Sˆ. Suppose that all optimal price movements have a bad direction change.
Choose such an M such that (1) M is minimal (i.e. M does not change direction without
closing trades); (2) M has a bad direction change at some price p /∈ Sˆ the latest (i.e. if
M has a bad direction change at step i, all optimal price movements have a bad direction
change at step at most i). Let r ∈ Sˆ such that r has the same sign as p, |r| > |p| and r is the
closest possible to p. Assume without loss of generality that r > p > 0 (the case r < p < 0
is symmetric). Thus M moves from p−1 to p at the i-th step, then goes to p−1, and p /∈ Sˆ.
The idea is that the (expected) gain from p to p+ 1 is at least the gain made from p− 1 to
p. If this gain is profitable, then moving from p to p+ 1 improves M . Otherwise, the move
from p − 1 to p was not optimal in the first place, and we can do better than M . We now
make this idea formal.
We assume that we have transformed the problem into an MTL instance, and are optim-
izing T ∗. Let M+ be the price movement obtained by inserting +1 and then −1 after the
i-th step in M . That is, M+ moves to p at step i, then to p + 1, then to p, and then does
exactly as M did afterwards. By our choice of M , M+ is suboptimal (for if it is optimal,
either it has no bad direction change or it occurs later than M). Similarly, let M− be the
price movement obtained by deleting the i-th step from M . So M− reaches price p − 1 at
step i− 1, and then does the same actions as M from step i+ 1 at price p− 1. It is not hard
to see that M+ and M− still close every trade as needed.
For some price p′, let T ∗(p′) = {T ∈ T ∗ : wT = p′ or `T = p′}. Because p /∈ Sˆ, to each
trade T ∈ T ∗(p) corresponds a distinct trade T+ ∈ T ∗(p + 1) such that T and T+ have
the same parameters except that T+ closes at one unit price higher (i.e. if T is a buy, then
T+ = (oT , wT + 1, `T , sT+) with wT = p, and if T is a sell, then T+ = (oT , wT , `T + 1, sT )
with `T = p, with sT+ = sT by the uniformity of T ). Moreover, as |T ∗(p)| = |T ∗(p + 1)|
this correspondence is one-to-one and onto.
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For two price movements M1,M2, denote by W (M1,M2) the set of trades of T ∗ won by
M1 and lost by M2. Now, for any price pair p1, p2 6= p + 1, the relative order of p1 and p2
in M is preserved by M+, i.e. p1 is reached before p2 by M if and only if p1 is reached
before p2 by M+. Thus any trade in W (M,M+) or W (M+,M) must belong to T ∗(p+ 1).
It is then not hard to see that T ∈W (M,M+) implies that T is a sell, and T ∈W (M+,M)
implies that T is a buy. In a similar fashion, any trade in W (M−,M) ∪W (M,M−) is in
T ∗(p). We can deduce the following claim, for which we omit the details:
I Claim 13.1. T ∈ W (M−,M) ⇔ T+ ∈ W (M,M+) and T ∈ W (M,M−) ⇔ T+ ∈
W (M+,M).
Denote ∆(M1,M2) = prT ∗(M1) − prT ∗(M2) for two price movements M1 and M2. By
our assumptions, ∆(M+,M) < 0 and ∆(M,M−) ≥ 0. This yields the following:
I Claim 13.2.
∑
T∈W (M−,M) sT −
∑
T∈W (M,M−) sT > 0
Proof. Note that ∆(M+,M) is solely due to the trades in W (M,M+) ∪W (M+,M), i.e.
∆(M+,M) =
∑
T+∈W (M+,M)(prT+(M+)−prT+(M))+
∑
T+∈W (M,M+)(prT+(M+)−prT+(M))
=
∑
T+∈W (M+,M)(p + 1− `T+)sT+ +
∑
T+∈W (M,M+)(−(p + 1) + wT+)sT+ < 0.
In a similar manner, the difference between M and M− is
0 ≤ ∆(M,M−) = ∑T∈W (M,M−)(p− `T )sT +∑T∈W (M−,M)(−p + wT )sT
=
∑
T+∈W (M+,M)(p− `T+)sT+ +
∑
T+∈W (M,M+)(−p + wT+)sT+
= ∆(M+,M)−∑T+∈W (M+,M) sT+ +∑T+∈W (M,M+) sT+
< −∑T+∈W (M+,M) sT+ +∑T+∈W (M,M+) sT+
where the second equality is due to Claim 13.1 and the uniformity of T .
We get
∑
T+∈W (M,M+) sT+−
∑
T+∈W (M+,M) sT+ > 0 and Claim 13.2 follows by applying
Claim 13.1 on this expression. J
In words, what is won byM− has a greater total weight than what is won by M . We will
use that to our advantage and derive a better price movement. Let z ≤ 0 be the minimum
price reached by M (and M−) before step i, and let q < z be the minimum price reached
by M− after the i-th step but before reaching price p. Thus going from p− 1 to q in M− is
responsible for all the trades in W (M−,M) ∪W (M,M−).
Consider q′ such that q ≤ q′ < z, and let Mq′ be the price movement that mimics M−
until step i − 1, reaching p − 1, then goes down to q′, then to p, and finally does exactly
what M does from step i. Observe that in particular, Mq = M . It is not hard to check that
Mq
′ closes every trade as required.
We will count ∆(Mq′ ,M), but a bit differently than above. Let TU ∈ T be one of the
input uniform trades. As T is uniform, all deterministic trades T ∈ T ∗U have the same size
1
|wˆTU ||ˆ`TU |
sTU . Denote this size by s∗TU . Suppose now that TU is a buy trade with wˆTU = p
and ˆ`TU < z. Then for every price q′′ with max(ˆ`TU , q′) ≤ q′′ < z, the deterministic trade
T ∗U (p, q′′) is in W (M,Mq
′). For q′ < k < z, let Lk be the set of trades TU of T such that
ˆ`
TU = k, and let Lq′ be those trades TU of T with ˆ`TU ≤ q′. One can verify that
W (M,Mq′) =
⋃z−q′
i=1
⋃
TU∈Lz−i
⋃i−1
j=0 T
∗
U (p, z − i + j).
In particular, setting q′ = q and using the fact that W (M,Mq) = W (M,M−), we can
deduce
∑
T∈W (M,M−) sT =
∑z−q
i=1
∑
TU∈Lz−i is
∗
TU
.
As for W (Mq′ ,M), let Wk be the trades of TU in T such that wˆTU = k, and Wq′ those
with wˆTU ≤ q′. Similarly as above, we have
W (Mq′ ,M) =
⋃z−q′
i=1
⋃
TU∈Wz−i
⋃i−1
j=0 T
∗
U (p, z − i + j).
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Since W (Mq,M) = W (M−,M), we have
∑
T∈W (M−,M) sT =
∑z−q
i=1
∑
TU∈Wz−i is
∗
TU
. Im-
portantly, Claim 13.2 now implies
∑z−q
i=1
∑
TU∈Wz−i is
∗
TU
−∑z−qi=1 ∑TU∈Lz−i is∗TU > 0 (*).
We now calculate ∆(Mq′ ,M) by considering W (Mq′ ,M) and W (M,Mq′) separately.
∑
T∈W (Mq′ ,M)
prT (Mq
′
)− prT (M) =
z−q′∑
i=1
∑
TU∈Wz−i
i−1∑
j=0
(prT∗
U
(p,z−i+j)(Mq
′
)− prT∗
U
(p,z−i+j)(M))
=
z−q′∑
i=1
∑
TU∈Wz−i
i−1∑
j=0
(−(z − i + j) + p)s∗TU
=
z−q′∑
i=1
∑
TU∈Wz−i
is∗TU (p− z + 1/2 + i/2)
=
z−q′∑
i=1
(p− z + 1/2 + i/2)
∑
TU∈Wz−i
is∗TU
and for W (M,Mq′),
∑
T∈W (M,Mq′ )
prT (Mq
′
)− prT (M) =
z−q′∑
i=1
∑
TU∈Lz−i
i−1∑
j=0
(z − i + j − p)s∗TU
=
z−q′∑
i=1
(z − p− 1/2− i/2)
∑
TU∈Lz−i
is∗TU
Letting K = p− z + 1/2, adding these two values, we get
∆(Mq
′
,M) =
z−q′∑
i=1
(K + i/2)
∑
TU∈Wz−i
is∗TU +
z−q′∑
i=1
(−K − i/2)
∑
TU∈Lz−i
is∗TU
=
z−q′∑
i=1
(K + i/2)
 ∑
TU∈Wz−i
is∗TU −
∑
TU∈Lz−i
is∗TU

We are almost done here. Because if we let n = z − q and Xi =
∑
TU∈Wz−i s
∗
TU
−∑
TU∈Lz−i s
∗
TU
, by (*) we have
∑n
i=1 iXi > 0, and by Lemma 13 there exists a n′ = q′ − z
such that ∆(Mq′ ,M) =
∑n′
i=1(K + i/2)iXi > 0, contradicting the optimality of M . J
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